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Perhaps it is time to investigate the possibility that biology has no empirical laws of evolution 
because of the strategies of model building that biologists have adopted.
E. Sober (1997)
     There have been intense debates since the 1950’s about the possibility to use the 
theory of natural selection to derive predictions. Most of the discussions about the 
predictiveness of biology (the “predictiveness thesis”) involved arguments about 
the status of biological theories, the presence of laws in biology, and so on. But few 
comments have been made on the different kinds of predictions and on the specific status 
of predictions in biology. I focus on this issue, and maintain that it is not necessary to 
claim that biological and physical theories have identical status and realize predictions 
in the same way to support the predictiveness thesis.
Some precisions about predictions
     There is a standard model, or family of models, of predictions: the covering-law 
models of prediction. The most famous of these models is Hempel & Oppenheim (1948)’s 
deductive-nomological model, where a statement E is deduced from lawlike statements 
(universal proposition) and statements about initial conditions.
     The DN model and the other covering-law models built by Hempel where laws 
are statistical or the statement E induced and not deduced, involves symmetry 
between explanation and prediction. Prediction and explanation being in all these 
models inference of an event E from a set of laws and a set of initial conditions, the 
only difference is not in the logical form of the prediction or explanation but in the 
knowledge of E: if it is known before the deduction, it is an explanation, if it is not, it is 
a prediction.
     Moreover, in these models all the laws used to predict a phenomenon E come from 
the same theory. These statements are all formulated in a language with the same domain 
of interpretation. No laws from other theories seem to be necessary to the derivation of 
predictions.
     For the standard model, a prediction is thus a deduction of a future or unknown event 
from initial conditions and laws belonging to one theory.
     If the covering-laws models of explanation have been criticized and alternative 
models proposed since the 1960’s, it is only recently, with the debate around the role of 
novel predictions as a proof for scientific realism, that new accounts of prediction have 
been proposed. 
     It is now for example widely acknowledged that a prediction does not have to be a 
forecast, i.e. a statement about the future, or a statement about something unknown in 
the past, present or future. This kind of temporal account of prediction can lead to severe 
paradoxes: the same inference of an event would be an explanation or a prediction for 
different scientists depending on the information they knew at the time they made this 
inference. But it seems that what is relevant is not the information they knew but rather 
the information they used to infer this event. Worrall (forthcoming) has thus argued 
that there is no reason to accept that only because a fact is unknown at the time he is 
inferred from a hypothesis it will count as a predicted fact, and count more than a fact 
already known (an accommodated fact): a phenomenon E is predicted by a hypothesis 
if it has not been used in the construction of this hypothesis, i.e in the setting of the free 
parameters of the hypothesis. It is the heuristic novelty and not the temporal novelty 
of the fact which matters. The relevant distinction is then not between prediction and 
explanation, but between ad hoc and non ad hoc entailment of a fact by a theory.
     Moreover: we do not need laws to make predictions. The rise of statistical 
methodologies in all the fields of science has given birth to other predictive processes 
than deductions in a mathematical framework. Forster and Sober (1997, 17) showed 
that predictions do not have to be made in a deductive framework to distinguish genuine 
predictions from ad hoc accommodations:
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     It is then possible to talk about predictions even when scientists do not deduce their 
predictions from laws but draw their predictive models from statistical databases. 
     Finally, one of the facts often overlooked is the importance of a plurality of 
hypothesis for predictions: in order to predict a concrete event it is often needed to 
gather a lot of information about the initial conditions of the system, and it is really 
extraordinary if this information involve phenomenon described by one theory only. 
Prediction is an activity for those Sober (1997, 461) calls “pluralists”, the scientists who 
consider phenomena on the border of different theories.
     My purpose is not to build a non-standard model or an alternative to the standard 
model, but only to stress the diversity of predictions and of processes of prediction-
making in science. Too often it is considered that the covering-law models give a 
fair account of prediction and that troubles begin with the thesis of the symmetry of 
prediction and explanation. That is precisely the case of the controversy about the 
predictiveness of biology, which I evoke briefly in the following section.
History of the problem of the predictiveness of biology
     It has soon been remarked that the symmetry between explanation and prediction of 
the DN model and its followers do not seem applicable to biological theories. Scriven 
(1959) argues that the selection theory relies on the concept of “fitness” which refers to 
a connection of an organism to his environment. Thus we cannot predict the evolution 
of the fitness of an organism nor the survival of its offspring because we cannot predict 
the environmental changes. But we can, a posteriori, give an explanation for the 
evolutionary success or extinction of an organism. Mayr (1961, 150) explictly subscribes 
to Scriven’s argument: 
          Probably nothing in biology is less predictable than the future course of evolution. Looking 
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Although we reject the hypothetico-deductive picture of science, we do accept the usual 
conclusion that there is an important distinction to be drawn between reasonable revision and 
ad hoc evasion.   
     In other words, even if they had been really good in biology, dinosaurs could not 
have predicted their own extinction (but we can explain it).
     All these critics of the symmetry between explanation and prediction accept the 
description of predictions of the covering-law model1 . Several authors like Mary B. 
Williams or Zdislaw Kochanski have argued for the predictiveness of biology against 
the conclusion of Mayr and Scriven, but without explicitly questioning the standard 
model of prediction. They aimed at revealing implicit laws and deduction implicitly 
used by the students of natural selection.
     This view reached its height with Mary B. Williams’ (1970, 1973b) axiomatic of the 
theory of natural selection and quantitative derivation of predictions from axioms.
     For Williams, if we can axiomatize statements of the theory of evolution in order 
to deduce predictions about populations of entities like we do in statistical physics 
for populations of molecules, the apparent randomness of biological phenomena is no 
obstacle to the predictiveness of the theory of natural selection. The randomness only 
come when we want to state which particular individual in those populations have or not 
the feature stated in the prediction: “the logical peculiarity [of evolutionary prediction] 
is not a property of evolutionary theory, it is a property of the human sized perspective 
on evolutionary theory” (Williams 1973a, 536).  
     Although I share the predictiveness thesis with Williams and Zochanski, I think that 
their view and strategy are misled and may even undermine the predictiveness thesis. 
Without criticizing the standard model of prediction it is not possible to give a fair 
account of how predictions and models are built in evolutionary biology. I expose in the 
following section a case of biological prediction to show how it would seem unnatural 
to analyze it with the standard model of predictions.
A case of biological prediction: Can we predict the loci of evolution?
     Different studies in microbiology showed that on the long-term (2 decades, 30 000 
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at the Permian reptiles, who would predicted that most of the more flourishing groups would 
become extinct and that one of the most undistinguished branches would give rise to the 
mammals?  
generations) populations of bacteria such as Escherichia coli (Lenski 2004) or 
bacteriophage viruses (Wichman et al. 1999) drawn from the same ancestral population 
and under the same selective pressure, have known parallel evolution, both at phenotypic 
and genotypic levels.
     This has lead to the extensive study of connections between what Mayr called 
functional and evolutionary biology and to the following question: can we predict, for a 
given selective pressure, what will be the transformation of the code which will lead to 
adaptive mutations?
     Two biologists of development, Orgogozo and Stern (2008, 2009) have studied the 
hypothesis that most of the evolutionary relevant mutations take place in the cis-
regulatory regions of genes 2  to claim that “genetic evolution is predictable”.
     Orgogozo and Stern have built a database of published studies providing compelling 
evidence for the individual genetic mutations causing phenotypic variation. This 
methodology is clearly based on statistical analysis: the statistical tests used by 
Orgogozo and Stern are G test, a measure of likelihood ratio often used in biological 
sciences since the 1980s. 
     Stern and Orgogozo do not mention or use any “law”. They do not try to generalize 
the cis-regulatory mutations hypothesis but to prove that without empirical data analysis, 
this hypothesis has no predictive power. Thus it seems natural to consider that Stern 
and Orgogozo’s work does not fit in a hypothetico-deductive picture of science or in the 
standard model of prediction.
     Moreover, Orgogozo and Stern precise their prediction by appealing to other 
biological sciences: developmental biology for instance is used to prove that some 
genes have more chance to have specific effects than other genes in the same regulatory 
network. For example, the development of the bristles, sensory organs on the back of 
Drosophila melanogaster, involves several genes but one, scute, is an “input-output 
device”: during the development it integrates an extensive array of inputs, the regulatory 
state, and produce an on or off transcriptional output. It is then responsible for the 
differentiation of almost all cells of the back of the fly. That is why such genes like scute 
have more chance to be involved in long term evolution: they are what Orgogozo and 
Stern call “hot spot genes”. This is the basis for the following prediction: “We predict 
The predictive capacity of biological theories64
that the cis-regulatory region of input-output genes may be hotspots for other phenotypic 
characteristics” (Orgogozo and Stern 2009, 747) 
     It seems obvious to say that Orgogozo and Stern are pluralists: they merge models 
from different theories of the biological sciences to realize predictions. The conclusion 
of their paper is clear on the subject: “By fusing developmental and evolutionary 
genetics, evolutionary biologists may be able to predict, in a probabilistic sense, the 
mutations underlying phenotypic evolution” (Orgogozo and Stern 2008, 2171) 
     Finally, because this prediction refers to long term evolution, it has not been today 
used to predict unknown mutations: “our prediction based on regulatory network is a 
post hoc explanation” (Ibid., 2170). But it does not stop Orgogozo and Stern to use the 
word “prediction” because they were able to infer the evolutionary role of mutations in 
the cis-regulatory region of scute with only a pattern of developmental regulation, i.e. by 
using considerations about the ontogeny of Drosophilia melanogaster and not about is 
phylogeny. This prediction is then heuristic novel. 
     The study of Orgogozo and Stern's work then presented a biological prediction 
relative to evolution far from fitting naturally in the standard model of prediction. But 
if we acknowledge that biological predictions do not fit in covering-law models, can we 
still support a strong predictiveness thesis claiming not only that there are predictions 
in biology but also that biology and physics have the same predictive power? The last 
section deals with this problem.
The predictive capacity of the theory of natural selection
We must distinguish between:  
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-  Predictive process: how a statement about phenomena or facts results, in a non 
ad hoc way, from a hypothesis or a theory connected with auxiliaries assumption 
through a series of inferences.
-  Predictive capacity (of a theory): the range of phenomena predicted by a theory. 
Roughly speaking, it refers to the diversity of phenomena whose probability 
become higher if a theory or hypothesis is assumed as correct, i.e. the phenomena E 
such as P(E|T) > P(E). 
     However, it is difficult to compute directly this increase of probability because we 
do not know the prior probability P(E): all we can do is to compare its probability 
within two different theoretical backgrounds (P(E|T) and P(E|T’)). If a phenomenon 
had a low probability for all theories before being predicted by T, we can be qualified 
as a surprising prediction. Surprising predictions are thus symptomatic of an important 
predictive capacity. 
     Standard and non standard model of prediction describe predictive processes, but 
what is at stake when we ask if biology and physics have the same predictive power 
is predictive capacity. Two theories may be used in different predictive processes (in 
fact each theory offer different possibilities of prediction-making) but have the same 
predictive capacity. We can say that prediction are different in biology and in physics 
but still support the thesis that biological theories and physical theories have similar 
predictive capacities. 
     However we can only evaluate the predictive capacity of a theory if we can identify 
clearly which derivations of empirical facts count as prediction. Popper for example 
suspects “Darwinism” of ad hoc evasion: “Darwin’s theory of sexual selection is partly 
an attempt to explain falsifying instances of this theory; such things, for example, as 
the peacock’s tail, or the stag’s antlers” (Popper 1976, 199) But if we adopt a heuristic 
definition of prediction and accommodation, Darwin’s theory of sexual selection appears 
not as an ad hoc evasion but as a prediction. Even if we had known nothing of the 
peacock’s tail Darwin’s theory of selection is sufficient to predict the selection of traits 
without any survival’s utility other than in the process of mating. 
     In this nonstandard account of prediction, Ramsus Grønfeldt Winther (2009, 894), 
has shown that there are good reasons to think that parallel evolution is a surprising 
prediction of the theory of natural selection, because it could not have been explained by 
evolutionary theories with no reference to selection and selective pressure. In the same 
manner the prediction of Orgogozo and Stern is a surprising one, because the importance 
of cis-regulatory mutations of hot spot genes over long-term evolution is a consequence 
of selective pressure on mutations. And if it is confirmed it could be counted as an 
important corroboration of the theory of natural selection.
     It is clear that evolutionary biology does not have the same level of precision than 
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general relativity of quantum mechanics. But no other contemporary theory to my 
knowledge has such an extension over all the phenomena of a discipline. Everyone, 
including the opponent to the predictiveness thesis recognizes that one of the major 
theoretical virtues of Darwinism is its unification of a large range of phenomena. It 
compensates its inferiority of predictive precision by a superiority of diversity of 
phenomena. 
Conclusion
     We may never be able to fully measure the predictive capacity of a theory. It is 
maybe more a matter of scientist’s intuition than a matter of crude computation. 
However, by distinguishing predictive capacity and predictive process we can, instead 
of opposing predictive capacity and explanatory unification as two different theoretical 
virtues, consider that they reveal the same virtue. We can then defend the status of the 
selectionist theory of evolution as a mature predictive theory without identifying its 
predictions to the one found in physics. 
Notes
1.  Recently the debate over the symmetry of prediction and explanation has reappeared in the field of 
methodology of historical natural science (c.f., Cleland 2011). Cleland uses Scriven’s argument and 
if she criticizes the account of explanation of covering-law model it is clear that for her this model 
is a sound way to describe predictions.
2.  All genes are composed of two fundamentally different regions: a region encoding the gene 
product – a protein or RNA – and adjacent cis-regulatory DNA that encodes the instructions 
governing when and where the gene product will be produced.
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